Abstract. We present instances of MPKCs (multivariate public key cryptosystems) with design, given the best attacks we know, and implement them on commodity PC hardware. We also show that they can hold their own compared to traditional alternatives. In fact, they can be up to an order of magnitude faster.
Introduction
MPKCs (multivariate public key cryptosystems) [14, 31] are PKCs whose public keys are multivariate polynomials in many small variables. It has two properties that are often touted: Firstly, it is considered a significant possibility for PostQuantum Cryptography, with potential to resist future attacks with quantum computers. Secondly, it is often considered to be faster than the competition.
Extant MPKCs almost always hide the private map Q via composition with two affine maps S, T . So, P = (p 1 
The public key consists of the polynomials in P. P(0) is always taken to be zero. In any given scheme, the central map Q belongs to a certain class of quadratic maps whose inverse can be computed relatively easily. The maps S, T are affine (sometimes linear) and full-rank. The x j are called the central variables. The polynomials giving y i in x are called the central polynomials; when necessary to distinguish between the variable and the value, we will write y i = q i (x). The key of a MPKC is the design of the central map because, solving a generic multivariate quadratic system is hard, so the best solution for finding w given z invariably turns to other means, which depend on the structure of Q.
Questions
Four or five years ago, it was shown that instances of TTS and C * − , specifically TTS/4 and SFLASH, are faster signature schemes than traditional competition using RSA and ECC [1, 10, 33] . These two instances both been broken in the meantime [18, 20] . Now that the width of a typical ALU is 64 bits, commodity PC hardware has never been more friendly to RSA and ECC. While multivariates still represent a future-proofing effort, can we still say that MPKCs are efficient on commodity hardware?
Our Answers
Currently the fastest multivariate PKCs seems to be from the Rainbow and IC families [16, 17] . We run comparisons using Pentium III (P3) machines (on which NESSIE contestants are tested) and modern Core 2 and Opteron (hereafter C2 an K8) machines. On these test runs, we can say that compared to implementations using standard PKCs (DSA, RSA, ECDSA), present instances of MPKCs with design security levels of around 2 80 can hold their own in terms of efficiency. In this paper, we describe how we select our Rainbow and IC-derived instances sketch our implementation. We also suggest the new approach of using bit-slicing when evaluating in GF (16) or other small fields during the construction of the private map.
In the comparison here, we use D. J. Bernstein's eBATs system to do benchmarking. We can conclude that
3IC
− p is comparable to SFLASH, but not as fast as Rainbow. 2. Rainbow is fast and TTS faster, although the security is not as well studied.
2IC
+ i is a very fast way to build an encryption scheme. [24, 20] and internal perturbation [23] . Ways to circumvent these attacks are proposed in [13, 19] .
The above attacks the cryptosystem as an EIP or "structural" problem. To solve the system of equations, we have this
where each p i is a quadratic in x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ). All coefficients and variables are in K = GF(q), the field with q elements.
Best known methods for generic MQ are F 4 -F 5 or XL whose complexities [11, 21, 22, 32] are very hard to evaluate; asymptotic formulas can be found in [2, 3, 32] .
Summary and Future Work
Our programs are not very polished; it merely serves to show that MPKCs can still be fairly fast compared to the state-of-the-art traditional PKCs even on the most modern and advanced microprocessors. There are some recent advances in algorithms also, such as computations based on the inverted twisted Edwards curves [5, 6, 7] , which shows that when tuned for the platform, the traditional cryptosystems can get quite a bit faster. It still remains to us to optimize more for specific architectures including embedded platforms. Further, it is an open question on whether the TTS schemes, with some randomness in the central maps, can be made with comparable security as equally sized Rainbow schemes. So far we do not have a conclusive answer.
Rainbow and TTS Families
We characterize a Rainbow [16] type PKC with u stages:
-The segment structure is given by a sequence 0
In every q k , where k ∈ O l , there is no cross-term x i x j where both i and j are in O l at all. So given all the y i with v l < i ≤ v l+1 , and all the x j with j ≤ v l , we can compute
S i is the i-th vinegar set and O i the corresponding i-th oil set. -To expedite computations, some coefficients (α (k) ij ) may be fixed (e.g., set to zero), chosen at random (and included in the private key), or be interrelated in a predetermined manner.
From the components of y that corresponds to the polynomials p v1+1 , . . . p v2 , we obtain a set of o 1 equations in the variables x k , (k ∈ O 1 ). We may repeat the process to find all remaining variables.
For historical reasons, a Rainbow type signature scheme is said to be a TTS [33] scheme if the coefficients of Q are sparse.
Known Attacks and Security Criteria
1. Rank (or Low Rank, MinRank) attack to find a central equation with least rank [33] .
Here as below, the unit m is a multiplications in K, and v 1 the number of vinegars in layer 1. This is the "MinRank" attack of [25] . as improved by [8, 33] . 2. Dual Rank (or High Rank) attack [9, 25] , which finds a variable appearing the fewest number of times in a central equation cross-term [18, 33] :
where v counts the vinegar variables that never appears until the final segment.
Trying for a direct solution. The complexity is roughly as MQ(q; m, m).
4. Using the Reconciliation Attack [18] , the complexity is as MQ(q; v u , m). 5. Using the Rainbow Band Separation from [18] , the complexity is determined by that of MQ(q; n, m + n). 6. Against TTS, there is Oil-and-Vinegar Separation [30, 26, 27] , which finds an Oil subspace that is sufficiently large (estimates as corrected in [33] ).
o is the max. oil set size, i.e., there is a set of o central variables which are never multiplied together in the central equations, and no more.
Choosing Rainbow Instances
First suppose that we wish to use SHA-1, which has 160 bits. It is established by [18] that using GF(2 8 ) there is no way to get to 2 80 security using roughly that length hash, unpadded.
Specifically, to get the complexity of MQ(2 8 , m, m), to above 2 80 (the direct attack) we need about m = 24. Then we need MQ(2 8 , n, n+ m) to get above 2
80
(the Rainbow Band Separation), which requires at least n = 42. This requires an 192-bit hash digest plus padding and a signature length of 336 bits with the vinegar sequence (18, 12, 12) . If we look at smaller fields, that's a different story. If we use GF(2 4 ), we need 20 oil variables each in the last segment and at least 20 vinegar variables in the first segment to get by the minrank and high rank attacks. To be comparable to the sizes of 3IC-p, we choose the vinegar (structural) sequence (24, 20, 20) . The digest is 160 bits and the signature 192. We use random parameters under this framework and don't do TTS. The implementations are described below. In each of the two instances, the central map is inverted by setting up and solving two identically-sized linear systems.
Choosing TTS Instances
TTS of the same size over GF (2 8 ) or GF(2 4 ) are 2× or more the speed of than a Rainbow instance. They also tend to have instances also have much lower memory requirement. But we don't really know about their security.
The following are TTS instances built with exactly the same rainbow structural parameters and called henceforth TTS/7. They have exactly the same size input and output as the corresponding Rainbow instances:
Q is structured as follows: (14) x πi (17) , i = 18 · · · 29 [indices 0 · · · 17 appears exactly once in each random permutation π i , and exactly once among the σ, σ (where six σ i slots are empty)]; 
The -Invertible Cycle ( IC) and Derivatives
The -invertible cycle [17] can be best considered an improved version or extension of Matsumoto-Imai, otherwise known as C * [28] . Let's review first the latter.
Triangular (and Oil-and-Vinegar, and variants thereof) systems are sometimes called "single-field" or "small-field" approaches to MPKC design, in contrast to the approach taken by Matsumoto and Imai in 1988. In such "big-field" variants, the central map is really a map in a larger field L, a degree n extension of a finite field K. To be quite precise, we have a map Q : L → L that we can invert, and pick a K-linear bijection φ : L → K n . Then we have the following multivariate polynomial map, which is presumably quadratic (for efficiency):
then, one "hide" this map Q by composing from both sides by two invertible affine linear maps S and T in K n , as in Eq. 1. Matsumoto and Imai suggest that we pick a K of characteristic 2 and this map Q Q :
where x is an element in L, and such that gcd(1 + q α , q n − 1) = 1. The last condition ensures that the map Q has an inverse, which is given by
where h(1 + q α ) = 1 mod (q n − 1). This ensures that we can decrypt any secret message easily by this inverse. Hereafter we will simply identify a vector space K k with larger field L, and Q with Q, totally omitting the isomorphism φ from formulas.
IC also uses an intermediate field L = K k and extends C * by using the following central map from (L * ) to itself:
For "standard 3IC", = 3, α = 0. Invertion in (L * ) 3 is then easy.
Most of the analysis of the properties of the 3IC map can be found in [17] the 3IC and C * maps has a lot in common. Typically, we take out 1/3 of the variables with a minus variation (3IC − ). For encryption schemes, "2IC" or = 2, q = 2, α = 1 is suggested.
We construct 2ICi like we do PMI [12] : Take v = (v 1 , . . . , v r ) to be an r-tuple of random affine forms in the variables x. Let f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) be a random r-tuple of quadratic functions in v. Let our new Q be defined by
where the power operation assumes the vector space to represent a field. The number of Patarin relations decrease quickly down to 0 as r increases. For every y, we may find Q −1 (y) by guessing at v(x) = b, finding a candidate x = Q −1 2IC (y + b) and checking the initial assumption that v(x) = b. Since we repeat the high going-to-the-h-th-power procedure q r times, we are almost forced to let q = 2 and make r as low as possible.
Known Attacks to Internal Perturbation and Defenses
IC has so much in common with C * that we need the same variations. In other words, we need to do 3IC − p (with minus and projection) and 2IC + i (with internal perturbation and plus), paralleling C * − p and C * + i (a.k.a. PMI+). The cryptanalysis of PMI and hence 2ICi depends on the idea that for a randomly chosen b, the probability is q −r that it lies in the kernel K of the linear part of v. When that happens, v(x + b) = v(x) for any x. Since q −r is not too small, if we can distinguish between a vector b ∈ T −1 K (back-mapped into x-space) and b ∈ T −1 K, we can bypass the protection of the perturbation, find our bilinear relations and accomplish the cryptanalysis.
In [23] , Fouque, Granboulan and Stern built a one-sided distinguisher using a test on the kernel of the polar form or symmetric difference DP(w, b) = P(b + w) − P(b) − P(w). We say that t(b) = 1 if dim ker w DP(b, w) = 2 gcd(n,α) − 1, and t(b) = 0 otherwise. If b ∈ K, then t(b) = 1 with probability one, otherwise it is less than one. In fact if gcd(n, α) > 1, it is is an almost perfect distinguisher. We omit the gory details and refer the reader to [23] for the complete differential cryptanalysis.
Typically, to defeat this attack, we need to add a random equations to the central map. For 2ICi as for PMI, both a and r are roughly proportional to n creating 2IC + i like we did PMI+ [13] . PMI+(n, r, a, α) refers to a map from GF(2 n ) with r perturbations, a extra variables, and a central map of x → x 2 α +1 .
Similarly, 2IC
+ i(n, r, a) refers to 2IC with r perturbations dimensions and a added equations.
Known Attacks to Minus Variants and Defenses
The attack found by Stern etc. can be explained by considering the case of C * cryptosystem. We recollect that the symmetric differential of any function G, defined formally:
is bilinear and symmetric in its variables a and x. Let ζ be an element in the big field L. Then we have
Clearly the public key of C * − inherits some of that symmetry. Now not every skew-symmetric action by a matrix M ζ that corresponds to an L-multiplication that result in M T ζ H i + H i M ζ being in the span of the public-key differential matrices, because S := span{H i : i = 1 · · · n − r} as compared to span{H i : i = 1 · · · n} is missing r of the basis matrices. However, as the authors of [20] argued heuristically and backed up with empirical evidence, if we just pick the first three M T ζ H i + H i M ζ matrices, or any three random linear combinations of the form
and demand that they fall in S, then 1. There is a good chance to find a nontrivial M ζ satisfying that requirement; 2. This matrix really correspond to a multiplication by ζ in L; 3. Applying the skew-symmetric action of this M ζ to the public-key matrices leads to other matrices in span{H i : i = 1 · · · n} that is not in S.
Why three? There are n(n − 1)/2 degrees of freedom in the H i , so to form a span of n− r matrices takes n(n− 3)/2+r linear relations among its components (n − r and not n because if we are attacking C * − , we are missing r components of the public key). There are n 2 degrees of freedom in an n × n matrix U . So, if we take a random public key, it is always possible to find a U such that
provided that 3n > 2r. However, if we ask that
there are many more conditions than degrees of freedom, hence it is unlikely to find a nontrivial solution for truly random H i . Conversely, for a set of public keys from C * , tests [20] shows that it almost surely eventually recovers the missing r equations and break the scheme.
Similarly, [24] and the related [29] shows a similar attack (with a more complex backend) almost surely breaks 3IC − and any other IC − . For the IC case, the point is the differential expose the symmetry for a linear map (
. Exactly the same symmetric property is found enabling the same kind of attacks.
It was pointed out [15] that Internal Perturbation is almost exactly equal to both Vinegar variables and Projection, or fixing the input to an affine subspace. Let s be one, two or more. We basically set s variables of the public key to be zero to create the new public key. However, in the case of signature schemes, each projected dimension will slow down the signing process by a factor of q. A differential attack looks for an invariant or a symmetry. Restricting to a subspace of the original w-space breaks a symmetry. Something like the Minus variant destroys an invariant. Hence the use of projection by itself prevents some attacks.
In [19] , it was checked experimentally, for various C * parameters n and θ, the effect of restricting the internal function to a randomly chosen subspace H of various dimensions s. This is a projected C * − instance of parameters (q, n, r, s). We repeated this check for 3IC
− and discover that again the attacks from [24, 29] are prevented. We call this setup 3IC − p(q, k, s).
Choosing Instances
For signature schemes, we choose C * − p(2 4 , 74, 22, 1), which uses 208-bit hashes and is related to the original FLASH by the fact that it uses half as wide variables and project one. We also choose 3IC − p(2 4 , 32, 1), which acts on 256-bit hashes. To invert the public map of projected minus signature schemes:
1. Put in random numbers to the "minus" coordinates. For the encryptions schemes, we choose PMI+(136, 6, 18, 8) and 2IC (128,6,16) and (256, 12, 32) .
To invert the public map of internally perturbed plus encryption schemes:
1. Invert the linear transformation T to get y. 
Implementation Techniques
Most of the techniques here are not new, just implemented here. However, we do suggest that the bit-sliced Gaussian Elimination idea is new.
Evaluation of Public Polynomials
We pretty much follow the suggestions of [4] for evaluation of the public polynomials. I.e., over GF(2 8 ) we use traditional methods, i.e., logarithmic and exponential tables (full 64kB multiplication is faster for long streaming work but has a much higher up-front time cost for one-time use). Over GF(2 4 ) we use bit-slicing and build lookup tables of all the cross-terms. Over GF (2) we evaluate only the non-zero polynomials.
Operating on Tower Fields
During working with the inversion of the central map, we operate the big-field systems using as much of tower fields as we can. We note that firstly, GF (2) 
where the addition is the bitwise XOR and the multiplication of expressions of a, b, c, d and α i are done in GF(2
While most of the instances we work with only looks at tower fields going up powers of two, a degree-three extension is similar with the extension being quotiented against t 3 +t+1 and similar polynomials, and a three-way Karatsuba is relatively easy. We can do a similar thing for raising to a power of five.
Bit-Sliced GF(16) Rainbow Implementations
It is noted in [4] that GF(4) and GF(16) can be bitsliced for good effect. Actually, any GF(2 k ) for small k can be bitsliced this way. In particular, it is possible to exploit the bitslicing to evaluate the private map.
1. Invert the linear transformation T to get y from z. We can use bitslicing here to multiply each z i to one columne of the matrix M
−1
T . 2. Guess at the initial block of vinegar variables 3. Compute the first system to be solved. 4. Solve the first system via Gauss-Jordan elimination with bitslice. 5. Compute the second system to be solved. 6. Solve the second system via Gauss-Jordan elimination with bitslice. We have computed all of x. 7. Invert the linear transformation S to get w from x.
Note that during the bitslice solving, every equation can be stored as four bitvectors (here 32-bit or double words suffices), which stores every coefficient along with the constant term. In doing Gauss-Jordan elimination, we use a sequence of bit test choices to multiply the pivot equation so that the pivot coefficient becomes 1, and then use bit-slicing SIMD multiplication to add the correct multiple to every other equation. Bit-Sliced GF(16) is not used for TTS since the set-up takes too much time.
TTS Implementations
There are a few things to note:
1. Due to the sparsity of the central maps, setting up the Gaussian elimination to run using bitslice takes too much time. Hence, for TTS in GF (16) we complete the entire computation of the private map expressing each GF(16) element as a nybble (4 bits or half a byte) and start the evaluation of the public map by converting the nybble vector packed two to a byte, to the bitslice form. 2. Again for GF(16), we maintain two 4kByte multiplication tables that allows us to lookup either abc or ab and ac at the same time. 3. We use the special form of key generation mentioned in [33, 34] . That is, following Imai and Matsumoto [28] , we divide the coefficients involved in each public key polynomial into linear, square, and crossterm portions thus:
R ijk , which comprise most of the public key, may be computed as in [34] :
The second sum is over all cross-terms p x α x β in the central equation for y . For every pair i < j, we can compute at once R ijk for every k in O(n 2 ) totalling O(n 4 ). Similar computations for P ik and Q ik take even less time.
The instances that we chose are tested not to suffer the same kind of attacks that fell previous TTS schemes, but we still don't have any conclusive evidence one way or the other of how likely this type of system can stand in the long run.
